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Selection of 3013 Containers for Field Surveillance 
 
by 
 
Larry Peppers, Elizabeth Kelly, James McClard, Gary Friday, Theodore Venetz, and Jerry Stakebake 
Abstract 
This report revises and combines three earlier reports1–3 dealing with the binning, statistical 
sampling, and sample selection of 3013 containers for field surveillance. It includes changes to 
the binning specification resulting from completion of the Savannah River Site packaging 
campaign and new information from the shelf-life program and field surveillance activities. The 
revised bin assignments result in changes to the random sample specification. These changes are 
necessary to meet the statistical requirements of the surveillance program. This report will be 
reviewed regularly and revised as needed. 
 
Section 1 of this report summarizes the results of an extensive effort to assign all of the current 
and projected 3013 containers in the Department of Energy (DOE) inventory to one of three bins 
(Innocuous, Pressure and Corrosion, or Pressure) based on potential failure mechanisms. 
Grouping containers into bins provides a framework to make a statistical selection of individual 
containers from the entire population for destructive and nondestructive field surveillance. The 
binning process consisted of three main steps. First, the packaged containers were binned using 
information in the Integrated Surveillance Program database and a decision tree. The second task 
was to assign those containers that could not be binned using the decision tree to a specific bin 
using container-by-container engineering review. The final task was to evaluate containers not 
yet packaged and assign them to bins using process knowledge. The technical basis for the 
decisions made during the binning process is included in Section 1. A composite decision tree 
and a summary table show all of the containers projected to be in the DOE inventory at the 
conclusion of packaging at all sites. Decision trees that provide an overview of the binning 
process and logic are included for each site. 
 
Section 2 of this report describes the approach to the statistical selection of containers for 
surveillance and consists of a revision of the earlier statistical sampling report.2 The requirement 
of 99.9% probability of observing at least one of the worst 5% (99.9/5%) of the containers with a 
potential for degradation is used to determine the number of containers in the random sample for 
the Pressure and Corrosion and the Pressure bins. Sampling requirements for the Innocuous bin 
are not based on the 99.9/5% requirement; rather, they are based on evaluating the assumption of 
no significant degradation of, or variability between, containers relative to corrosion or pressure 
generation within the Innocuous bin population as valid. 
 
Section 3 of this report focuses on the actual selection of 3013 containers for surveillance. 
Surveillance containers are identified by the year that the surveillance should be performed. In 
addition to the randomly selected containers, containers were selected from the entire population, 
based on engineering judgment for each of these years. The judgmental sampling targets 
containers with the greatest potential for gas generation and/or corrosion. The factors used for 
judgmental sample selection are documented in this section. A more detailed discussion of the 
FY 2005 sample selection process is contained in the previous FY 2005 sample selection report.3 
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Background 
The U.S. nuclear weapons program has generated large quantities of excess plutonium. This 
material must be safely stored pending final disposition. Requirements for packaging and storage 
of plutonium-bearing materials have been addressed in the Department of Energy (DOE) 
Standard, “Stabilization, Packaging, and Storage of Plutonium-Bearing Materials,” DOE-STD-
3013,4 and are being implemented throughout the DOE complex. In order to ensure the safe 
storage of plutonium in 3013-type containers, the 3013 standard directed that a surveillance plan 
be developed and used for monitoring the condition of these containers during storage. DOE has 
implemented an Integrated Surveillance Program (ISP)5 that is designed to integrate individual 
sites into a corporate, cost-effective surveillance effort. The ISP consists of two independent 
programs: the Shelf-Life program to closely monitor the behavior of selected materials under 
laboratory conditions and the Field Surveillance program to destructively and nondestructively 
evaluate production 3013 containers and materials during storage. 
 
The Surveillance and Monitoring Plan for DOE-STD-3013 materials6 (S&M Plan) outlines a 
statistical sampling approach for the surveillance of 3013 packaged containers. In addition to the 
statistical sampling, other containers may be added to the surveillance containers based on 
engineering judgment.3 For the statistical sampling portion of the program, the ISP Steering 
Committee has directed that, with a 99.9% probability, at least one from the worst 5% (99.9/5% 
criteria) of the pressure-generating or corrosive containers in a defined population is evaluated 
during the random portion of the surveillance program. To facilitate selection and surveillance, 
the 3013 containers are binned based on the mechanisms that could potentially challenge the 
container. The bins are defined as Innocuous, Pressure, and Pressure and Corrosion. During the 
binning process, containers that were not categorized well enough to be placed in one of the bins 
using a binning decision tree required a container-by-container Engineering Review (ER).  
 
The purpose of this report is to describe the process used in binning containers and to document 
the results from binning all packaged 3013 containers as well as those containers not yet 
packaged. Although this report emphasizes packaged containers, unprocessed items from Los 
Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) are 
also addressed (Section 1). This report then describes the statistical selection of containers in the 
Pressure bin and Pressure and Corrosion bin to achieve the 99.9/5% criteria. Sampling of the 
Innocuous bin was used to confirm the binning assumption of no significant degradation of or 
variability between the containers relative to corrosion or pressure generation (Section 2). The 
report then focuses on statistical and judgmental sample selection of containers for 
nondestructive (NDE) and destructive evaluation (DE) for the first three years of the field 
surveillance program and defines a schedule for statistical sample selection for the out-years of 
the field surveillance program (Section 3). 
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1.0 Binning of 3013 Containers for Field Surveillance 
1.1 Introduction  
Revisions to the bin assignment of containers made in Section 1 of this report are the result of 
several changes in the binning philosophy from the original report1 and the inclusion of new 
data. Changes include the completion of the Savannah River Site (SRS) 3013 packaging effort, 
reanalysis of Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (Rocky Flats or RFETS) Fourier 
transform infrared spectroscopy (FTIR) moisture data, use of the best available moisture data in 
the binning decision, inclusion of additional prompt gamma analysis, revising the prompt gamma 
fluoride concentration used to determine potentially corrosive containers to match the minimum 
detectible chloride concentration, inclusion of chemical analysis results from some Hanford and 
SRS containers, and revising the criteria for a container to be considered Innocuous. These 
changes are reflected in the revised binning decision trees, Figures 1.1 through 1.7, and are 
discussed in further detail below.  
 
1.1.1 Changes to the Binning Philosophy 
Better moisture data are now available for some of the Rocky Flats and Hanford containers (see 
Section 1.1.4 below). Reevaluation of the Rocky Flats FTIR data provided more accurate 
moisture results for all of the FTIR measurements.7 Previously, in cases where the Thermo-
gravimetric Analysis (TGA) result met the acceptance criteria, TGA was used as the certification 
moisture value and as the basis for the binning decision even when FTIR results were available. 
For cases where the FTIR result was used for certification, the reevaluated FTIR moisture value 
is considered more accurate. In both cases, the reevaluated FTIR result is now used for binning 
decisions. 
 
Some Hanford convenience cans gained weight in storage before packaging into inner 
containers. In the original binning report,1 these weight gains were not included in the ISP 
database8 and were not part of the binning decisions. The current ISP database now includes the 
Hanford weight gain data. The weight gain during interim storage has been added to the 
measured moisture result and is included in the database as the best estimate of moisture in the 
container. The assumption is that any weight gain during storage is attributed to the material 
adsorbing moisture. 
 
The limit of detection for fluoride (0.1 wt%) by prompt gamma analysis is lower than for 
chloride (0.8 wt%). In addition, at a given concentration, chloride has a higher potential for 
corrosion of the container. This difference in detection limits places a disproportionately large 
number of low fluoride (<0.8 wt%) containers in the Pressure and Corrosion bin, thus diluting 
the bin population. Using the fluoride assumption in section 1.3 below, containers with less than 
0.8 wt% fluorides have been removed from the Pressure and Corrosion bin. 
 
Containers were previously considered to be Innocuous when they passed all tests in the decision 
tree and did not require an engineering review. This allowed containers without prompt gamma 
or chemistry analysis to automatically be placed into the Innocuous bin. Containers without 
prompt gamma or chemistry analysis are now required to have an engineering review before they 
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are considered innocuous. Also, containers with detected low fluoride are required to go though 
engineering review before being considered innocuous.  
 
Revisions were made as to which material groups are considered corrosive by process 
knowledge. Process knowledge assumptions of which material groups contained chlorides and 
fluorides were validated using prompt gamma results and other historical information; the only 
material groups that are considered inherently corrosive are as follows:  
• Hanford represented group9 “Impure and scrap oxides from Rocky Flats” (1E) or “Impure 
and scrap Pu oxides with 30–80 wt% Pu PFP generated scrap oxides” (2B) that do not 
have prompt gamma analysis, 
• Rocky Flats group10 “Pyrochemical — byproduct oxides” (2B) or “Screenings from Pu 
oxidation — byproduct oxides” (2E), 
• SRS materials from Rocky Flats origin that are identified as ARF material in the SRS 
group11 “Metal oxidation from Rocky Flats (foundry oxide, 80–85 wt%)” (1A), and 
• Containers from LLNL with any portion of washed material in the container 
 
The LLNL containers mentioned in the final bullet were considered corrosive because many of 
the LLNL containers with washed material still showed significant amounts of chloride as 
measured by prompt gamma.12 As a conservative approach, these containers are considered 
corrosive. 
1.1.2 New Data 
SRS has now completed their 3013 packaging campaign. SRS packaged a total of 920 
containers, which included 618 containers of metal and 302 containers of oxide. This is 120 
containers less than what was projected in the original binning report1 and includes two fewer 
metal containers and 118 fewer oxide containers.  
 
Chemical analysis data for several Hanford and SRS containers have been added to the ISP 
database and are now available for use in binning decisions. Thirteen containers were identified 
from these data as having greater than 1,000 ppm chloride or greater than 8,000 ppm fluoride 
(analysis results reported in units of ppm are equivalent to results reported in µg/g in most cases). 
 
More prompt gamma analyses have been completed and are available for binning decisions.13 
Additional prompt gamma results are available from SRS containers as required as part of the 
certification. Additional Hanford prompt gamma analyses were performed on containers that 
previously lacked prompt gamma results. Also, Rocky Flats containers that were part of the FY 
2005 nondestructive surveillance program at SRS were remeasured by prompt gamma using 
60-minute count times instead of the 15-minute count times originally used at Rocky Flats. 
The longer count time provided better lower detection limits for chloride and fluoride. These 
additional prompt gamma results are now used in place of process knowledge and previously 
available prompt gamma results for use in binning of these containers. In the case of the more 
sensitive analysis performed on Rocky Flats containers, prompt gamma analysis detected 
chloride in several containers where previous analysis showed none. In one case, chloride was 
not found in the 60-minute reanalysis but was detected in the original 15-minute analysis. In this 
case, the more conservative analysis (chloride present) is used. 
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1.1.3 Binning Assumptions 
The following conditions are assumed and form the basis for all binning decisions:  
• Metal containers without loosely adhering oxide are innocuous, based on historical and 
scientific data.14-15 
• Chloride salts and high concentrations of fluoride salts are potentially corrosive to types 
304 and 316 stainless steels.16–17 
• Chloride poses greater risk of corrosion than fluoride at the same concentration.18 
• Pressurization of containers in the Pressure and Corrosion bin is primarily caused from 
radiolysis of water to generate hydrogen gas (other gases may be generated but in minor 
amounts relative to hydrogen).19 
• Pressurization of containers in the Pressure bin is due to a combination of factors, 
including the radiolysis of water to generate hydrogen gas and the generation of other 
gases such as O2, N2, NO2, SO2, CO2, CO, and CH4 (the mechanisms for generation of 
these other gases are not well understood but may contribute a substantial percentage of 
the total pressure).19 
• The amount of water present directly affects the maximum potential pressure in a 
container from the radiolysis of water.4 
• Containers with less than 0.8 wt% fluoride are assumed not to be in the worst 5% of the 
Pressure and Corrosion bin population based on the fluoride level alone. 
• Containers with chloride at levels below the prompt gamma detection threshold are 
assumed not to be in the worst 5% of the Pressure and Corrosion bin population.  
• Containers with high-purity oxide containing less than 0.1 wt% water are assumed not to 
be in the worst 5% of the population based on pressure generation. 
1.1.4 Determination of Best Available Moisture Measurement 
Moisture analysis methods vary in their accuracy to measure moisture exclusive of other effects. 
Loss on ignition (LOI) and TGA are generally recognized to be conservative because of 
measurement of weight loss of more than the water present. Coupling the TGA analysis with 
either FTIR or mass spectroscopy (MS) is more specific to measurement of only the water in the 
sample. 
 
LOI and TGA methods measure any weight change to the sample when heated to 1,000°C. 
Weight change can be due to loss of water or evaporation of salts or because of the oxidation of 
other materials present (e.g., carbon or uranium). The main difference between LOI and TGA is 
when the final weight of the sample is measured. For LOI analysis, the sample is weighed at 
room temperature (or generally below 100°C), but it is measured at 1,000°C when using TGA 
analysis. Readsorption of water during cooling of the LOI samples masks the actual weight loss 
of the sample, which is the basis for using a lower 0.05 wt% binning cutoff for the LOI analysis 
compared to 0.10 wt% for all other methods. 
 
Because some containers were stored for significant amounts of time between sampling for 
moisture analysis and welding into inner containers, weight change (gain) during storage was 
interpreted as moisture adsorbed by the material. Where applicable, weight gain during storage is 
added to the moisture measurement (from any of the methods) and is used as a better 
representation of the moisture in a container than the moisture measurement alone. 
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Rocky Flats containers measured with FTIR analysis were subject to reevaluation of the moisture 
result because of changes in the way the FTIR baseline was measured and subtracted. The 
revised baseline subtraction improved the accuracy of the moisture result, and the recalculated 
result is considered better than the originally reported value.7 A significant portion of the Rocky 
Flats containers used the TGA analysis as the certification value, but also had FTIR analysis 
results available. In these cases, the FTIR analysis (specifically, the recalculated FTIR analysis) 
is considered the most accurate or best moisture value. 
 
For containers having more than one moisture value, the preferred analytical method is listed 
below in order of decreasing accuracy: 
 
1. Recalculated FTIR analysis 
2. FTIR or MS 
3. TGA 
4. LOI 
 
In addition, if a convenience can showed a storage weight gain, adding the weight gain to any of 
the above analyses is better than using an analysis alone. The ISP database contains all moisture 
measurement results for any container and has a pointer to the best available result. 
1.2 Scope 
The scope of Section 1 consisted of a three-tiered review of all 3013 containers with the primary 
objective of placing each container into one of the three bins for the purpose of surveillance. 
 
Tier 1—Containers that have already been packaged and have been assigned to their 
appropriate surveillance bins based on information in the data package provided for each 
container using the binning decision tree Figure 1-1.  
 
Tier 2—Containers from Rocky Flats, Hanford, SRS, and LLNL that are currently 
packaged and have failed the initial screening for immediate assignment to a surveillance 
bin required an engineering review before they were assigned to an appropriate bin. 
Containers in this tier were individually reviewed before assignment to one of the three 
surveillance bins. 
 
Tier 3—Items not yet packaged from LLNL and LANL. Some of these items can easily 
be binned based on being either metal or an oxide with greater than 85 wt% plutonium 
(Pu). The remainder required a somewhat subjective and conservative engineering review 
before assigning them to a bin for surveillance. Assigning items in this group to bins at 
this time only serves to provide total bin estimates for the purpose of defining the total 
number of samples required in the surveillance program. 
1.3 Surveillance Bins 
Containers in the 3013 inventory are initially sorted according to the potential failure mechanism 
that they may present, i.e., pressure generation, corrosion plus pressure generation, or neither. 
The three bins or indicator populations used for sorting are Pressure, Pressure and Corrosion, and 
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Innocuous. Moisture is needed to create the potential for pressurization. A corrosive 
classification, although useful for isolating a failure mechanism, is tied to the pressure-generating 
classification because moisture is also needed to form the corrosive electrolyte and is identified 
by the classification of Pressure and Corrosion. The Innocuous bin is used for containers that 
have no potential for either pressurization or corrosion. Metals and high-purity oxides with low 
moisture are generally considered Innocuous.14-15 These three bins or strata form the initial 
indicator populations that are used to sort containers for different levels of surveillance. Binning 
was accomplished using the decision tree shown in Figure 1.1. Information to facilitate the 
binning came primarily from the ISP database that contains all of the information from the 
Product Certification Databases (PCD) generated by the packaging sites as well as additional 
data from other sources such as small and large-scale testing or reevaluation of existing data 
present in the database (e.g., moisture data). The ISP database includes information such as 
process knowledge regarding the source of the material, moisture content of the material, prompt 
gamma analytical data taken after packaging, and chemical analysis data. The decision tree is set 
up to bin metal containers, oxide containers with corrosive impurities, pure oxides (containing 
greater than 85 wt% Pu + Am + Np), and impure oxides with greater than a threshold moisture 
content using the database information. Impure oxides with less than the threshold moisture 
content (0.05 wt% LOI or 0.10 wt% TGA/FTIR/MS) were required to go through the process of 
ER before appropriate bin assignments could be made. 
1.4 General Binning Criteria 
1.4.1 Initial Binning of Materials 
The initial binning evaluation assigned containers with only Pu metal plus any associated metal 
impurities to the Innocuous bin, as illustrated by the decision tree (Figure 1.1). The second 
binning operation was to separate containers with a potential for corrosion. The primary 
constituent for causing corrosion is chloride salts or possibly fluoride-containing materials. 
Using information supplied in the database, containers identified as containing either chloride 
(greater than 1,000 ppm) or fluoride (greater than 8,000 ppm) were placed in the Pressure and 
Corrosion bin. Identification of chloride or fluoride could be accomplished by chemical analysis, 
prompt gamma analysis, or process knowledge of the material. These methods for determining 
the presence of corrosive materials have varying degrees of accuracy and sensitivity. For 
example, using process knowledge alone, the 3013 container may or may not contain chlorides 
or fluorides. If items in the container originated from a process that used chlorides, it was placed 
in the Pressure and Corrosion bin unless there was additional analytical information to the 
contrary. If the chemical analysis showed chloride greater than 1,000 ppm or fluoride greater 
than 8,000 ppm or if the prompt gamma analysis detected either chloride (any positive detection) 
or fluoride greater than or equal to 0.8 wt% (8,000 ppm), the container was placed in the 
Pressure and Corrosion bin. The prompt gamma detection limit for chlorine is about 0.8 wt%, 
and the detection limit for fluorine is about 0.1 wt%.12 
 
The third criterion, used for the binning of pure oxide material that showed no evidence for 
containing corrosive materials, was the final moisture content of the oxide. The DOE-STD-3013 
sets the moisture limit for oxide materials at 0.5 wt%. However, the actual acceptance limit for 
moisture content varied from site to site depending on the method for moisture analysis and the 
date the container was generated. To accommodate the different acceptance values for each site, 
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a conservative moisture limit was established for binning of the pure oxide materials. Containers 
with an LOI result greater than 0.05 wt% were assigned to the Pressure bin. When moisture was 
measured by TGA, FTIR, or MS, a moisture limit of greater than or equal to 0.10 wt% was 
established for placing the container in the Pressure bin. Containers with pure oxide with 
moisture content below these limits were placed in the Innocuous bin unless the fluoride or 
prompt gamma exception applied. 
 
If a container successfully passed the screening test for Pressure and Corrosion as well as for 
Pressure, and had less than 85 wt% (Pu + Am + Np), it required an ER to evaluate each container 
individually. 
1.4.2 Binning of ER Materials 
All containers selected for ER have been prescreened as described above (with the exception of 
those not yet packaged) using the logic diagram shown in Figure 1.1. All packaged containers 
have a Pu + Am + Np content of less than 85 wt% (or meet the low fluoride or prompt gamma 
exception) with no known chloride content from process knowledge or analytical analyses and 
have a moisture content of less than 0.05 wt% by LOI or less than 0.1 wt% by TGA and/or 
FTIR/MS. Uranium was excluded from the prescreening process because its large measurement 
uncertainty could skew the binning results. However, the presence of uranium was considered 
during the ER. The criteria for binning ER containers are listed below. 
 
Criterion 1: Containers with greater than 85 wt% Pu + Am + Np + U (total actinide) 
were placed in the Innocuous bin. These containers were reviewed on an individual basis 
to ensure that the material came from a historically pure stream so that the uranium 
measurement uncertainty could not cause an impure material to be binned as innocuous. 
 
Criterion 2: Containers with total actinide content between 80 and 85 wt% were 
reviewed on an individual basis. Those containers from a process that historically 
produced pure material with a moisture content of less than 0.05 wt% were placed in the 
Innocuous bin unless there was a suspected problem with the moisture analysis identified 
through a nonconformance report (NCR) or other documented production comment. 
Containers not meeting the moisture criteria were placed in the Pressure bin. 
 
The only exception to the 0.05 wt% criterion was for mixed plutonium-uranium oxide 
containers processed in the Stabilization Packaging Equipment (SPE) dry line at Hanford 
that had a TGA moisture value exceeding 0.05 wt%. The TGA results were reviewed on 
an individual basis to determine if excess weight loss occurred at high temperatures and 
could be attributed to oxygen loss from the uranium oxide and not water. For these cases, 
the container was placed in the Innocuous bin. 
 
Criterion 3: Containers with a total actinide content of less than 80 wt% were placed in 
the Pressure bin. (Exceptions were oxide containers evaluated under Criterion 4.) 
 
Criterion 4: Oxide containers produced by magnesium hydroxide precipitation from pure 
plutonium nitrate solutions represent a special class of items where the major impurity is 
magnesium oxide and prompt gamma indicates no other significant impurities. 
 9 
 
Hanford–Containers from Hanford packaged in the SPE (dry) line and having a 
TGA moisture content of less than 0.05 wt% were placed in the Innocuous bin. 
All others were placed in the Pressure bin. 
 
Rocky Flats–Containers from Rocky Flats must have a TGA value of less than 
0.05 wt%, and the glovebox moisture content at the time of packaging must be 
less than 1,000 ppm. Containers meeting these criteria were placed in the 
Innocuous bin. All others were placed in the Pressure bin. Containers suspected to 
have originated from other than pure plutonium nitrate, e.g., Pu/U solutions, were 
evaluated using Criteria 1, 2, or 3. 
 
Criterion 5: This criterion applied only to Rocky Flats containers; similar data are not 
available from other sites. During the moisture analysis using TGA/FTIR, evaluation of 
the FTIR data indicated the presence of hydrogen chloride (HCl) in some samples.20 
HCl was found to occur in three temperature ranges: 20°C–350°C, 350°C–670°C; and 
670°C–1,000°C. However, only the HCl values in the low temperature range are 
important to the material storage temperatures because the material temperatures are not 
expected to exceed 350°C. A total of 36 containers with low temperature HCl have been 
found in the Rocky Flats inventory with four of those containers in the ER category. 
This analytical method is very sensitive and possibly subject to contamination from other 
chloride-bearing samples. However, taking a very conservative approach, all 36 
containers were placed in the Pressure and Corrosion bin. It is highly likely that other 
sites have materials that would exhibit this property; but these could not be evaluated and 
were left in their predetermined bins. 
1.5 Binning Results for 3013 Containers 
1.5.1 Rocky Flats Containers 
A total of 1,888 containers from Rocky Flats required binning (Table 1.1). Of this total, 1,546 
containers were binned using the decision tree in Figure 1.1, and 342 containers were binned 
using the ER criteria described in section 1.4.2 above. Table 1.1 and Figure 1.3 summarize the 
binning results. The “ISP Sub Bin” column in Figure 1.1 refers to the decision criteria used to 
make the binning decision and is composed of three parts. The first part refers to the decision 
method used for binning, either BDT (binning decision tree) for containers that were directly 
binned or ER for containers that required individual review (see Figure 1.1). The second part 
refers to the decision block in the tree for containers starting with BDT or the ER criteria (see 
section 1.4.2) for containers starting with ER. The third part shows descriptors that specify the 
details of the decision as well as the binning result, “I” for Innocuous or “P” for Pressure where 
appropriate (e.g., “BDT-3-Cl-HCl” refers to containers that contained chlorine by prompt gamma 
and also showed HCl by FTIR analysis that is part of Criteria 5, and “ER-C2-P (Low F)” refers 
to low fluoride containers individually reviewed using Criteria 2 but did not meet the criteria to 
be considered Innocuous and where therefore assigned to the Pressure bin). 
 
Of the 342 ER containers reviewed, 167 were assigned to the Innocuous bin, 171 to Pressure, 
and 4 to Pressure and Corrosion. The composite binning of all 1,888 Rocky Flats 3013  
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Table 1.1 Rocky Flats Binning Summary 
ISP Bin ISP Sub Bin Total 
BDT-1 581 
BDT-6 60 
ER-BDT-6-I (Low F) 11 
ER-BDT-6-I (No PG) 3 
ER-C1-I 34 
ER-C1-I (No PG) 3 
ER-C2-I 28 
ER-C2-I (Low F) 11 
ER-C2-I (No PG) 4 
Innocuous 
ER-C4-I 73 
Innocuous Total 808 
BDT-5 550 
ER-C1-P 6 
ER-C1-P (Low F) 1 
ER-C1-P (No PG) 2 
ER-C2-P 16 
ER-C2-P (Low F) 3 
ER-C2-P (No PG) 1 
ER-C3 107 
ER-C3 (Low F) 27 
ER-C3 (No PG) 1 
Pressure 
ER-C4-P 7 
Pressure Total 721 
BDT-3-Cl 212 
BDT-3-Cl-HCl 32 
BDT-3-F 65 
BDT-3-F-HCl 2 
BDT-4-RF-2B 44 
ER-C5-HCl 3 
Pressure and Corrosion  
ER-C5-HCl (No PG) 1 
Pressure and Corrosion Total 359 
Rocky Flats Total 1888 
 
containers dispositioned 808 containers to Innocuous, 721 to Pressure, and 359 to Pressure and 
Corrosion. 
1.5.2 Hanford Containers 
A total of 2,257 containers from Hanford required binning. Of this total, 1,701 containers were 
binned directly using the decision tree in Figure 1.1, and 556 containers were binned using the 
ER criteria listed in section 1.4.2. Prompt gamma data were unavailable for 362 containers in the 
Hanford inventory. When prompt gamma analysis is complete, some containers may need to be 
moved to the Pressure and Corrosion bin from either the Pressure or Innocuous bins. Table 1.2 
and Figure 1.4 summarize the binning results. 
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Table 1.2 Hanford Binning Summary 
ISP Bin ISP Sub Bin Total 
BDT-1 310 
BDT-6 166 
ER-BDT-6-I (Low F) 6 
ER-BDT-6-I (No PG) 268 
ER-C1-I 42 
ER-C1-I (No PG) 5 
ER-C2-E-I 15 
ER-C2-I 22 
ER-C2-I (Low F) 1 
ER-C2-I (No PG) 26 
ER-C4-I 26 
Innocuous 
ER-C4-I (No PG) 34 
Innocuous Total 921 
BDT-5 635 
ER-BDT-6-P (No PG) 2 
ER-C2-E-P 4 
ER-C2-P 21 
ER-C2-P (Low F) 4 
ER-C2-P (No PG) 18 
ER-C3 28 
ER-C3 (Low F) 20 
ER-C3 (No PG) 9 
ER-C4-P 1 
Pressure 
ER-C4-P (No PG) 4 
Pressure Total 746 
BDT-2-Cl 10 
BDT-2-F 3 
BDT-3-Cl 324 
BDT-3-F 64 
BDT-4-H-1E 121 
Pressure and Corrosion 
BDT-4-H-2B 68 
Pressure and Corrosion Total 590 
Hanford Total 2257 
 
Of the 556 ER containers reviewed, 445 were assigned to the Innocuous bin, 111 to Pressure, 
and none to Pressure and Corrosion. The composite binning of all 2,257 Hanford 3013 containers 
dispositioned 921 containers to Innocuous, 746 to Pressure, and 590 to Pressure and Corrosion. 
1.5.3 LLNL Containers 
LLNL anticipates producing a total of 135 containers containing both metal and oxide. To date, 
74 containers have been packaged. Some of the oxide items containing chloride salts from 
pyrochemical processing were given an aqueous wash to remove the chloride. However, the 
prompt gamma spectra showed that at least 0.8 wt% chloride or fluoride still remains in some of 
the washed items.12 
 
Binning decisions for both the packaged and the projected number of unpackaged containers 
were made using the binning decision tree. All containers produced from the chloride wash  
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Table 1.3 LLNL Binning Summary for Existing Containers 
ISP Bin ISP Sub Bin Total 
BDT-1 6 
BDT-6 1 
Innocuous 
ER-C2-I 2 
Innocuous Total 9 
ER-C3 5 Pressure 
ER-C3 (Low F) 4 
Pressure Total 9 
BDT-3-Cl 8 
BDT-3-F 2 
Pressure and Corrosion 
BDT-4 (LLNL Washed) 46 
Pressure and Corrosion Total 56 
LLNL Total 74 
 
process were conservatively placed in the Pressure and Corrosion bin based on post-washing 
prompt gamma results. The 61 unpackaged containers received the most conservative evaluation 
and were placed in the Pressure and Corrosion bin. Table 1.3 and Figure 1.5 summarize the 
binning results. 
 
The composite binning of all 135 processed and projected LLNL 3013 containers dispositioned 
nine containers to Innocuous, nine to Pressure, and 117 to Pressure and Corrosion. 
1.5.4 SRS Containers 
A total of 920 containers from SRS required binning. Of this total, 867 containers were binned 
directly using the decision tree in Figure 1.1, and 53 containers were binned using the ER criteria 
described in section 1.4.2. Table 1.4 and Figure 1.6 summarize the binning results.  
 
A number of containers sent to SRS from Rocky Flats were binned in the Pressure and Corrosion 
bin based on process knowledge information provided by SRS that was not included the 
database. These containers were from material in the ARF group that was processed as 
stabilization runs PS-212 through PS-271. 
 
Of the 53 ER containers reviewed, 46 were assigned to the Innocuous bin, seven to Pressure, and 
none to Pressure and Corrosion. The composite binning of the 920 SRS 3013 containers 
dispositioned 746 containers to Innocuous, 103 to Pressure, and 71 to Pressure and Corrosion. 
 13 
 
Table 1.4 SRS Binning Summary 
ISP Bin ISP Sub Bin Total 
BDT-1 618 
BDT-6 82 
ER-BDT-6-I (Low F) 4 
ER-BDT-6-I (No PG) 22 
ER-C1-I 16 
Innocuous 
ER-C2-I 4 
Innocuous Total 746 
BDT-5 96 
ER-C2-P 1 
ER-C2-P (Low F) 2 
ER-C3 3 
Pressure 
ER-C3 (Low F) 1 
Pressure Total 103 
BDT-3-Cl 18 
BDT-3-F 14 
Pressure and Corrosion 
BDT-4-SR-ARF 39 
Pressure and Corrosion Total 71 
SRS Total 920 
 
1.5.5 LANL Containers 
Stabilization and packaging of oxides at LANL has begun. As of June 2006, approximately 40 
convenience cans have been packaged into inner containers, and of those, none have been 
certified as meeting all of the 3013 requirements, and none have been packaged into outer 3013 
containers. For surveillance purposes, an estimate was made of the total number of 3013 
containers to be produced using the Los Alamos National Laboratory Implementation Plan.21 It 
was assumed that each 3013 container would hold 3 kg of plutonium. To facilitate binning of the 
3013 containers, the excess material has been placed into categories (Table 1.5) based on the 
type of processing the oxide will receive. The material considered for packaging into 3013 
containers does not include oxide from weapons-component reprocessing. 
 
Oxide from Dry Operations consists of oxide with nominally greater than 70 wt% plutonium and 
will receive no further chemical reprocessing. The oxide will be stabilized per 3013 
requirements, packaged into 3013 containers, and characterized by prompt gamma analysis. 
Oxide in this category originated from several processes, including pyrochemical processing, 
metal oxidation, mixed oxides, and higher-purity oxide from liquid processing. Items containing 
chloride and nominally 20–70 wt% plutonium will undergo chloride reprocessing, which 
includes hydrochloric acid dissolution, solvent extraction, oxalate precipitation and calcination. 
The resulting oxide will be characterized by chemical analysis and is expected to contain greater 
than 85 wt% plutonium. Oxide/oxide-like materials containing 40–70 wt% plutonium (without 
chloride contamination) will undergo nitrate reprocessing using nitric acid (HNO3/HF)  
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Table 1.5 LANL Material Categories 
Process Pu (Kg) 
Number of 3013 
Containers 
Dry Operations (from vault, no reprocessing) 306 102 
Chloride/Nitrate Processing 339 113 
Total 645 215 
 
dissolution, ion exchange, and oxalate precipitation followed by calcination. The resulting oxide 
will also be characterized by chemical analysis and is expected to contain greater than 85 wt% 
plutonium.  
 
The initial projection of containers from Dry Operations (no recovery step) consists of 102 
containers with oxide greater than 70 wt% plutonium. Based on process knowledge, an estimated 
15 of these containers will be categorized as Innocuous, 57 containers as Pressure, and 30 
containers as Pressure and Corrosion. 
 
Of the 113 containers reprocessed using the chloride or nitrate process, all should have a 
plutonium content greater than 85 wt%. However, historical information on high-purity oxides 
suggests that 28 of these containers will have moisture content above the cutoff levels to be 
considered Innocuous and will be placed in the Pressure bin. The remaining 85 containers will go 
into the Innocuous bin. If oxides from chloride processing are found to contain residual chloride, 
all of the containers from this process will be placed in the Pressure and Corrosion bin. 
 
The binning decision tree for LANL containers is shown in Figure 1.7. These binning results are 
incomplete at this time and will be revised when more accurate data become available. The best 
estimate of the total population in each of the three bins is 100 containers in the Innocuous bin, 
30 containers in the Pressure and Corrosion bin, and 85 containers in the Pressure bin. 
1.6 Binning Summary 
Binning results for all 3013 containers are shown in the summary decision tree (Figure 1.2) and 
summarized in Table 1.6. The results from a cursory evaluation of containers yet to be packaged 
are also included in this table to provide a preliminary picture of the distribution of the total 3013 
containers expected to be in storage. It should be noted that the accuracy of the binning for 
containers not yet packaged varies with the quality of the information provided by the sites. 
If the final number of unpackaged containers varies from the estimated number, revisions to the 
sample specification defined in Section 2.0 may be required. Thus, a rough picture of the 
magnitude of the field surveillance program can be provided for planning purposes. Also 
included are the binning decision trees for each site (Figures 1.3 through 1.7). These decision 
trees reflect the data summarized in Table 1.6 and illustrate the inductive logic of the binning 
process. 
 15 
 
Table 1.6 Binning of All DOE 3013-Type Containers 
Site Innocuous Pressure 
Pressure 
And 
Corrosion Total 
 Rocky Flats 
 Packaged 808 (+22)* 721 (+115) 359 (-144) 1888 (-7)† 
 Hanford 
 Packaged 
 Unpackaged 
921 (-23) 
0 (-9) 
746 (+160) 
0 (-9) 
590 (-137) 
0 
2257 
0 (-18) 
 LLNL 
 Packaged 
 Unpackaged 
9 (+2) 
0 
9 (+4) 
0 
56 (-6) 
61 (0) 
 
74 (0) 
61 (0) 
 SRS 
 Packaged 
 Unpackaged 
746 (-3) 
0 (-41) 
103 (+103) 
0 (-150) 
71 (+71) 
0 (-100) 
920 
0 (-120) 
 LANL 
 Packaged 
 Unpackaged 
12 
88 (-68) 
18 
67 (+60) 
2 
28 (-119) 
32 
183 (-127) 
Total 2584 (-120) 1664 (+283) 1167 (-435) 5415 (-272) 
  * Numbers in ( ) indicate the change between FY 2005 and FY 2006. 
  † Rocky Flats sent LANL 7 metal containers that were removed from the surveillance program. 
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Figure 1.1. Generic decision tree for binning 3013 items for field surveillance. 
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Figure 1.2. Composite binning decision tree for all 3013 surveillance items. 
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Figure 1.3. Rocky Flats binning decision tree. 
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Figure 1.4. Hanford binning decision tree. 
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Figure 1.5. LLNL binning decision tree. 
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Figure 1.6. SRS binning decision tree. 
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Figure 1.7. LANL binning decision tree. 
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2.0 3013 Surveillance Sampling—The Statistical Sample 
2.1 Introduction  
The requirement of 99.9% probability of observing at least one of the worst 5% (denoted as 
99.9%/5%) is used to guide the statistical sampling process for the Pressure and Corrosion and 
Pressure bins. The hypergeometric distribution is used to determine the number of containers 
needed to meet this requirement.22 
 
Using this criterion does not necessarily mean that containers have significant degradation. It 
simply means that (in theory) at the end of 50 years, all containers could be evaluated and ranked 
for their degree of degradation (higher rank, higher degradation). This ranking could take place 
even if there was very little, if any, degradation, and even if the containers varied little in terms 
of degradation. The 5% with the highest scores would be the “worst” 5%. It is not necessary to 
actually rank the containers to implement this statistical approach. 
 
The main attribute of this approach is that it requires no assumptions about which container or 
group of containers are the “worst.” The random sampling alone provides the specified degree of 
confidence (e.g., 99.9%) that at least one of the containers from the worst 5% will be observed. It 
should be noted that an important assumption of this approach is that a container has a valid 
assessment of its ultimate (50 years) degradation when it is examined. 
 
The statistical calculations for the sample size are generally independent of population size if the 
population has over 500 items. However, the number of items in the worst 5% clearly depends 
on the population size. 
 
The statistical sample for the Innocuous bin is based on the assumption that these containers will 
show no degradation; therefore, there will be almost no variability in the pressurization and 
corrosion evaluations. A random sample of 10 containers is selected from this bin to test the 
assumptions of very little variability and no degradation. 
 
The statistical sample for the Pressure and Corrosion bin and Pressure bin gives a high level of 
confidence that at least one of the worst 5% of all containers in a bin will be observed in the 
samples selected. These samples also provide data for predicting the behavior of pressurization 
and corrosion for the entire population. However, the question remains, what if there are just a 
few “problematic containers” that are very different than the rest of the containers in the 
population? To address this issue, the statistical samples will be augmented with judgmental 
sampling. The judgmental sampling will use engineering judgment, results of the shelf-life 
studies, results of the statistical sampling, and other sources of information to target containers 
that could have the greatest potential for degradation. The combined approach of statistical and 
judgmental sampling is a powerful, cost-effective tool for ensuring the safe storage of the 3013 
containers. The details of the judgmental sampling are described in Section 3 of this report. 
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2.2 Statistical Sample Selection  
2.2.1 Sample Sizes 
Based on the number of containers in the Pressure and Corrosion and Pressure bins given in 
Section 1, Table 1.6, sample sizes of 128 containers for the Pressure and Corrosion bin and 130 
containers for the Pressure bin meet the 99.9%/5% criterion. However, the decision was made to 
evaluate 131 containers in the random sample for the Pressure and Corrosion bin.‡ 
 
The random sample was allocated proportionally to each packaging site. For example, for 
Hanford, the number of containers in the Pressure and Corrosion bin sample was 
 
590 (Hanford containers)/1,167(total containers in bin) x 131(total samples in bin) = 66 (Hanford containers in the sample) 
 
Table 2.1 gives the distribution of sample sizes across the various sites.  
 
The Pressure and Innocuous random NDE sampling campaigns began in 2005 and are scheduled 
to be completed in 2009.6 At this point, the results will be evaluated to determine future 
surveillance quantity and frequency. The containers must be at least three years old at the time of 
evaluation. Therefore, containers considered for the Pressure and Innocuous samples must have 
been packaged as of June 2006.  
 
Table 2.1. Distribution of Sample Sizes in the Pressure and Corrosion 
and Pressure Bins Across Sites 
 Pressure and Corrosion Pressure 
Hanford 66 61 
LLNL 13 1 
Rocky Flats 40 59 
SRS 8 8 
LANL 4 1 
TOTAL 131 130 
 
2.2.2 Sample Selection 
In all cases, items to be included in the random samples were selected using the “Random 
Sample,” option in the statistical software, S-Plus.23 However, as described below, this was done 
differently for the three bins.  
 
2.2.2.1 Pressure and Corrosion Bin 
For the Pressure and Corrosion bin, the S-Plus “Random Sample” option was used to generate n 
numbers (sample size) ranging from one to the total number of packaged containers in the bin-
site (e.g., 66 random numbers ranging from one to 590 for Pressure and Corrosion-Hanford). 
These random numbers were associated with container item identification numbers (ID) by 
                                                     
‡ The FY 2005 binning specification had more items in the Pressure and Corrosion bin, and the required sample size 
for that bin specification was 131. The decision was made to keep this number of items in the sample. 
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mapping them to the order that the container was generated for that bin at that packaging site. 
Appendix A, Table A-1 gives the container ID, site, current (FY 2006) bin assignment, reason 
for bin assignment as noted in the decision trees (FY 2006 Sub Bin) and inner can date and the 
fiscal year in which DE should be performed for the statistical samples for all of the packaging 
sites except for LANL and for 7 containers from the 61 that have not yet been packaged at 
LLNL. 
2.2.2.2 Pressure Bin 
For SRS, LLNL, and LANL the sample selection was done in the same way as the Pressure and 
Corrosion sample selection. For Rocky Flats and Hanford, the Pressure sample selection was 
done differently. As noted before, there had been a previous binning of containers and a previous 
random sample for each bin in FY 2005.1–3 The main difference between the FY 2005 bin 
assignments and the new FY 2006 bin assignments is that some containers moved from Pressure 
and Corrosion to the Pressure bin. For Rocky Flats and Hanford, the FY 2005 and FY 2006 
sample containers had been evaluated or were in the process of being evaluated.† To retain as 
much of the FY 2005 sample as possible and maintain the 99.9%/5% criterion, the following 
approach was taken for the Pressure bin.  
 
The bin-site sample size was proportionally allocated between the FY 2005 and FY 2006 
Pressure bin containers that remained after the FY 2006 rebinning and the new bin containers for 
each packaging site. This resulted in 14 containers in the sample from the new containers for 
Pressure-Hanford and 13 for Pressure-Rocky Flats (Table 2.2). The sample for the new bin 
containers was selected from the new containers as described for the Pressure and Corrosion bin. 
The sample for the old bin containers (47 for Hanford and 46 for Rocky Flats) was selected 
randomly from the FY 2005 sample. Appendix A, Table A-2 lists the information for Pressure 
bin containers as well as the fiscal year in which the NDE should be performed. 
 
Table 2.2.Pressure Bin Sample Selection for Hanford and Rocky Flats 
 
Containers 
New 
Containers 
Proportion 
New 
Containers
n 
(sample 
size) 
n from 
New 
Containers 
n from 
2005 
sample 
Hanford 746 168 .225 61 14 47 
Rocky Flats 721 154 .214 59 13 46 
 
2.2.2.3 Innocuous Bin 
The material in the Innocuous bin containers is either plutonium metal or relatively pure 
plutonium oxide with low water content. It is not credible for plutonium metal packaged per the 
3013 standard to generate pressure except for the relatively low pressure of helium generated 
from alpha decay.14 In addition, failure of the container from corrosion or metal-to-metal 
interaction between the plutonium metal and the storage container is also not credible.15 For 
these reasons, the MIS Working Group concluded that the metals present no risk of 
                                                     
† Note: None of the Pressure and Corrosion bin containers from the old sample specification had been evaluated 
destructively; therefore, it was decided to select all new containers for the Pressure and Corrosion bin. 
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pressurization or corrosion, and that the surveillance sample for the innocuous bin is focused on 
oxide containers only. This assumption will be evaluated at LANL when a metal item packaged 
at Rocky Flats in a 3013 container is opened for programmatic use. 
 
Ten oxide containers are to be evaluated for the Innocuous bin. These ten containers are selected 
randomly from the oxide population using stratified random sampling. The Innocuous bin is 
divided into three strata for sampling purposes; oxides classified as innocuous based on the 
decision tree with no need for engineering review (Oxides-No ER), oxides classified as 
innocuous using engineering review but not containing fluoride above 1,000 ppm (Oxides-ER-
No F) and those with fluoride above 1,000 ppm but below 8,000 ppm (Oxides-ER- F). Two 
containers are selected randomly from the fluoride stratum, and the other eight are proportionally 
allocated to the other strata and selected randomly from these strata. Table 2.3 shows the 
distribution of the number of containers and sample sizes. The containers selected for the 
Innocuous sample are also given in Appendix A, Table A-3, which lists the information for 
Innocuous containers as well as the fiscal year in which the NDE should be performed. 
 
Table 2.3. Distribution of Numbers of Containers and Numbers of 
Sample Containers in the Innocuous Bin 
Site Oxides – No ER Oxides – ER – No F Oxides-ER - F 
 # of 
Containers 
in stratum 
# of 
Containers 
in sample 
# of 
Containers 
in stratum 
# of 
Containers 
in sample 
# of 
Containers 
in stratum 
# of 
Containers 
in sample 
Hanford 166 1 438 3 7 - 
LLNL 1 - 2 - 0 - 
Rocky Flats 60 1 145 1 22 2 
SRS 82 1 42 1 4 - 
LANL 0 - 12 - - - 
Total 309 3 639 5 33 2 
 ER – Engineering Review for classification into Innocuous Bin. 
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3.0 Selection of 3013 Containers for Field Surveillance—Statistical and 
Judgmental Samples 
3.1 Introduction 
Using the criterion described in Sections 1 and 2, 131 containers were needed from the Pressure 
and Corrosion bin and 130 containers from the Pressure bin. The 131 containers from the 
Pressure and Corrosion bin will be destructively evaluated over a ten-year period beginning in 
2007. They will have NDE and DE, with some NDE beginning in Fiscal Year (FY) 2005. The 
130 containers from the Pressure bin will have NDE, and the evaluations are concentrated over a 
five-year period that began in FY 2005. In addition, two containers from the Pressure bin will be 
selected in years FY 2007, FY 2008, and FY 2009 to have DE performed to validate the 
assumption that there is no corrosion occurring in these containers.  
 
Packaging is ongoing, and a portion of the total population currently does not exist. In the 
Pressure and Corrosion bin, 1,076 of the projected 1,167 containers have been packaged. In the 
Pressure bin, 1,579 of the projected 1,664 containers have been packaged. Of the 131 containers 
in the statistical sample for the Pressure and Corrosion bin, 120 are packaged, and of the 130 
containers in the Pressure bin sample, 129 are packaged. 
 
The statistical sample is augmented with judgmental sampling to provide a powerful, cost-
effective tool for ensuring the safe storage of the 3013 containers. The judgmental sampling uses 
engineering judgment, results of the shelf-life studies, comparison of the statistical sample to the 
population, packaging and stabilization data and field surveillance results (when available) to 
identify additional containers for surveillance. The judgmental sample targets containers with the 
greatest potential for degradation and data gaps, if any, in the statistical sample. 
3.2 NDE Samples for FY 2005 
The following discussion presents the rationale that was used for the selection of containers for 
NDE in FY 2005. The FY 2005 NDE sample consists of a subset of the FY 2005 statistical 
sample and a judgmental sample. The containers in the judgmental sample were believed, on the 
basis of current data at the time of selection, to have the highest potential for pressurization 
and/or corrosion. 
3.2.1 Summary of FY 2005 Container Selection 
Table 3.1 lists the 52 containers selected for NDE in FY 2005, which met the minimum 
requirements of the ISP. Hanford evaluated 23 containers, SRS evaluated 27 containers 
(originally packaged at Rocky Flats), and LLNL evaluated two containers. Ten additional 
containers were examined by Hanford in FY 2005 (Table 3.2). 
 
It was originally believed that a few of the Hanford containers listed in Table 3.1 could not be 
accurately radiographed with the existing radiography system and software because they were 
what the facility calls “dead-zone-affected.”24-25 The facility requested that surveillance of these 
containers be deferred until software fixes were implemented. However, SRS expedited the 
development of a new software version that allowed multiple angle imaging of the container, 
allowing a best view to be selected. This version was successfully used on a test basis for these  
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Table 3.1. 3013 Containers Selected for NDE Surveillance in FY 2005 
Surveillance 
Site FY 2005 ISP Bin FY 2006 ISP Bin Surveillance Comment 
3013 
Container 
ID 
Innocuous Innocuous Random Sample H001189 
H001003 
H001201 
H001295 
H001464 
H001542 
H001844 
H001892 
H001925 
H002019 
H002066 
H002615 
Random Sample 
H002670 
Judgmental Sample. Maximum Estimated Pressure H003905 
Pressure Pressure 
Judgmental Sample. Oldest containers with >10 grams H2O H003733 
Pressure Random Sample H001948 
H001963 
H002554 
H003625 
Random Sample 
H003716 
Judgmental Sample. Highest CO2 H003312 
H001992 
Hanford 
Pressure and Corrosion 
Pressure and Corrosion 
Judgmental Sample. Oldest containers with >10 grams H2O 
H003896 
Hanford Total 23 
Pressure Pressure Random Sample L000206 LLNL 
Pressure and Corrosion Pressure and Corrosion Random Sample L000075 
LLNL Total 2 
Innocuous Innocuous Random Sample R601574 
R600212 
R600361 
R600453 
R600483 
R600885 
R601356 
R601451 
R601456 
R601829 
R601941 
R602040 
Pressure Pressure Random Sample 
R602072 
Innocuous Random Sample R610192 
H000906 Random Sample 
R601722 
Pressure 
Judgmental Sample. Oldest containers with >10 grams H2O R601859 
R610098 Random Sample 
R610229 
R610697 
R610735 
R610747 
Judgmental Sample. From HCl Plot 
R611398 
Judgmental Sample. Highest CO2 R610410 
Judgmental Sample. Highest SO2 R610548 
Judgmental Sample. Maximum Estimated Pressure Corrected H2O R610751 
SRS (Rocky 
Flats) 
Pressure and Corrosion 
Pressure and Corrosion 
Judgmental Sample. Maximum Estimated Pressure Uncorrected H2O R610767 
SRS (Rocky Flats) Total 27 
Grand Total 52 
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Table 3.2.Additional Hanford NDE samples in FY 2005 
FY 2005 ISP 
Bin 
FY 2006 ISP 
Bin Comment 
3013 
Container 
ID 
From precipitation of Misc. Lab Solution/RL 
Request H001181 
Pressure 
PFP Scrap Oxide/Highest Theoretical Pressure by 
TGA  H002444 
H002565 Rocky Flats Oxide with Chloride (ARF) 
H002715 
ARF, Highest water by Mass Spec H003710 
ARF, Second Highest water by Mass Spec H003737 
ARF/Bad PG/Container sampled for MOX 
program  H004075 
H002557 ARF with High water 
H003392 
Pressure and 
Corrosion 
Pressure and 
Corrosion 
From precipitation of Misc. Lab Solution/Highest 
Water by Mass Spec H001236 
 
affected samples in FY05, preserving the integrity of the random sample.26 This new version has 
been placed into service at Hanford, allowing any dead-zone-affected container to be 
radiographed.  
 
3.2.2 Process for Selecting Containers for FY 2005 
The containers in the statistical sample consisted of 25 containers from the Pressure bin random 
sample and ten containers from the Pressure and Corrosion bin random sample. The selection of 
containers from the random sample for NDE in FY 2005 was made by sorting containers from 
each site and each bin by age of the inner can weld date. Those older than the median age for a 
bin and a generation site were identified as possible candidates for selection. For each of these 
groups, the specified number of containers was selected randomly. 
 
The process for selecting containers for the judgmental sample in FY 2005 was twofold. The first 
step was a detailed comparison of the 3013 population to the 225 existing containers in the 
statistical sample to determine if there were any important properties of the population that are 
not represented adequately in the sample. A detailed analysis of the FY 2005 sample is 
documented in LA-UR-05-2193.3 No significant gaps in sample coverage were identified in the 
sample versus the total population. 
 
The second step consisted of a specification of those properties considered to be most important 
in terms of potential container pressurization and/or corrosion. Both of these steps involved 
considerable discussion during conference calls and meetings with the Materials Identification 
and Surveillance (MIS) Working Group and others. At the completion of the analyses and 
ensuing discussions, the MIS Working Group recommended containers for surveillance to the 
ISP Steering Committee, and the ISP Steering Committee approved the recommended NDE 
containers for FY 2005.27 
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3.2.3 Selection of Containers Based on Engineering Judgment  
Because no major data gaps were identified when the FY 2005 statistical sample was compared 
to the population,3 the MIS working group decided that containers for judgmental sampling 
should be based on a worst-case analysis. That is, those containers with the greatest potential for 
pressurization and/or corrosion, based on current information at the time of selection, should be 
considered for NDE in FY 2005. Four criteria were used to identify worst-case candidates: high 
reported water content, HCl generation during moisture measurement, detection of high levels of 
SO2 or CO2 during moisture measurement, and those containers with the maximum estimated 
pressure generation. 
3.2.3.1 Water Content 
For pressurization and/or corrosion to occur, water must be present. The 3013 Standard allows a 
maximum of 0.5 wt% of adsorbed water in a container. Using a criterion of the highest weight 
percent water was not sufficient to define the worst case for water content without taking into 
account the net weight of the container. Few containers had measured water content greater than 
ten grams. The four oldest containers with water content of around 10 grams or more were 
included in the judgmental sample (Table 3.1). The container certification moisture analysis was 
used for FY 2005 binning and the determination of grams of water for this analysis. As noted 
previously, binning criteria were changed for FY 2006, to use the best available moisture result. 
This resulted in many containers moving from the Pressure bin to the Innocuous bin. 
3.2.3.2 HCl Generation 
TGA-FTIR data that were collected at Rocky Flats for poststabilization verification of moisture 
content also showed HCl in the purge gas downstream of the sample during heating of some 
container samples. These observations were first documented in LA-UR-04-0654.20 The 
detection of HCl during these analyses is of interest because (1) it suggests a thermal mechanism 
for generation of a corrosive gas from stabilized material after packaging; (2) it may be a useful 
indicator of the presence of chlorine in stabilized material; and (3) it may reveal the presence of 
chemical forms of elemental chlorine and hydrogen that are of particular relevance in assessing 
corrosion risk. 
 
Figure 3.1 shows the total detected HCl over the 225°C to 465°C TGA temperature range versus 
the detected H2O over the full TGA range for all TGA-FTIR samples of stabilized material. Four 
of the five containers showing an unambiguous HCl signal were chosen for the judgmental 
sample. These include two of the three containers that released the most H2O and two containers 
from among those that released the most HCl and that also released H2O exceeding 0.1 wt%. The 
data points representing containers of interest for judgmental sampling are circled in Figure 3.1. 
3.2.3.3 SO2 and CO2 Generation 
TGA-FTIR data from Rocky Flats indicated a thermal release of CO2 and SO2 from some 
samples during poststabilization measurements. Calculations showed that CO2 and SO2 evolution 
can account for most of the mass loss in the subpopulation of Rocky Flats containers showing 
TGA mass loss greater than 0.3 wt%. About 5% of the 600 samples analyzed fall into this 
subpopulation. Potential pressure generation is the principal concern with regard to these  
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Figure 3.1. Detected HCl vs detected H2O from TGA-FTIR analysis of items originating at 
Rocky Flats. Items of interest as judgmental samples are circled. 
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Figure 3.2. CO2 and SO2 generation during TGA-FTIR analysis of Rocky Flats items. 
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gases. Neither gas was released in mole quantities exceeding the equivalent H2 possible from 
0.5 wt% H2O. Furthermore, the temperatures at which these gases were generated in the TGA 
exceeded storage temperatures with the exception of minor quantities. These points are discussed 
with regard to CO2 in LA-UR-03-0811.28 
 
Containers from Rocky Flats with the most CO2 and SO2 were selected for the judgmental 
sample. These containers are the two data points in the far top right in Figure 3.2. The Hanford 
container with the highest CO2 was selected for the judgmental sample on the basis of TGA-MS 
data where the sample showed low water content but greater than 1 wt% total weight loss 
determined to be CO2. 
3.2.3.4 Estimated Container Pressure Rise 
To identify containers with the greatest potential for pressurization, an algorithm was 
implemented to compute the pressure rise in containers known or suspected of containing 
chlorides. MIS items in the small-scale surveillance program that have chlorides present 
predominately generate hydrogen, but MIS items without chlorides generate other gases along 
with hydrogen.19 Hydrogen is generated by radiolysis of water that is present in the material. 
Containers with the highest computed pressure rise were considered for engineering judgment. 
 
Pressure rise was calculated using both the certification moisture value and the best available 
moisture value for each container. Container wattage, container weight, container volume, 
material assay (to calculate material density), and the worst-case G-value calculated from small-
scale tests were also required for the calculation. Pressure rise was calculated using the date the 
inner container was welded as the starting time and February 1, 2005, as the date of the 
calculated pressure. Complete detail on the pressure rise calculation is included in  
LA-UR-05-2193.3 
 
Based on the pressure rise calculations, two Rocky Flats containers were selected for judgmental 
sampling from the Pressure and Corrosion bin. One was based on the maximum uncorrected-
moisture (certification moisture value) pressure rise, and one was based on the maximum 
corrected-moisture (best moisture value) pressure rise. One container was selected for 
judgmental sampling from the Hanford-generated material Pressure bin based on the maximum 
uncorrected-moisture pressure rise. Table 3.1 shows the final selections for NDE based on 
pressure rise calculations.  
3.2.4 Recommendation of the MIS Working Group 
The MIS Working group provided a recommendation for the minimum number of containers on 
which each site should conduct NDE. This recommendation was based on comparisons of the 
random sample to the population, engineering review, and discussions among the MIS working 
group members, and was approved by the ISP Steering Committee.27 The list of containers in the 
ISP Steering Committee guidance was modified, based on logistical considerations at the 
surveillance sites and further discussions among the MIS working group members. Table 3.1 
contains the final list of required NDE samples for FY 2005. 
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3.3 NDE Samples for FY 2006 
Sample selection for FY 2006 surveillance activities were identified in FY 2005 using the 
binning results from FY 2005.1 The FY 2006 NDE sample consists of a random selection of 
containers from the remaining containers in the random sample and a judgmental sample. 
Engineering judgment considerations used for the FY 2006 sample were similar to the criteria 
used for FY 2005.  
3.3.1 Summary of FY 2006 Container Selection 
Table 3.3 lists the 47 containers selected for NDE in FY 2006. Of these, 25 (based on FY 2005 
binning) were from the Pressure random sample, and 11 were from the Pressure and Corrosion 
random sample; all were selected randomly. Of the remaining 11, nine were judgmental sample 
containers, and two were from the Innocuous bin random sample. The number of containers 
scheduled for evaluation by each site are as follows:  
 
• Hanford—24 containers,  
• SRS—22 containers (originally packaged at Rocky Flats), and  
• LLNL—1 container. 
 
These containers satisfy the FY06 selection criteria required by the ISP steering Committee for 
the DOE complex.29 All randomly selected containers were required to be at least three years old 
(from the inner can weld date) by the end of June 2006. This list has the minimum number of 
containers necessary to meet the requirements of the ISP. At least two additional Rocky Flats 
generated containers were examined by SRS in FY 2006 and 27 from Hanford (Table 3.4). As of 
July 2006, the FY 2006 sample evaluation was ongoing, and a complete summary of containers 
evaluated is not available. 
3.3.2 Judgmental Sample Selection for FY 2006 
Three judgmental samples were selected from SRS. Two of the originally selected SRS 
(FY 2005) containers were under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) control and could 
not be sampled in FY 2005. These containers were substituted with other containers for the FY 
2005 surveillance while efforts were made to remove them from IAEA control. The deferred 
containers were added back into the FY 2006 sample as judgmental samples. One additional 
judgmental sample was selected from the containers showing HCl in the Rocky Flats FTIR 
moisture analysis. 
 
Six judgmental samples were selected by the MIS working group from Hanford containers. Two 
were from pure button-line oxide (BLO) that had unusually high water content, one from oxide 
from impure solutions with high water content, and three from containers with chloride salt 
packaged in the RMC line with high water content. 
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Table 3.3. FY 2006 Surveillance Samples 
Surveillance 
Site FY 2005 ISP Bin FY 2006 ISP Bin Surveillance Comment 
3013 
Container 
ID 
Innocuous Innocuous Random Sample H003321 
H003062 
H001386 
H002823 
H003833 
H002166 
H002180 
H002352 
H003779 
H002771 
H003049 
H003098 
Random Sample 
H004649 
H001577 
Pressure Pressure 
Judgmental Sample. Pure Oxide (BLO), 
high H2O H002429 
Random Sample H003094 Pressure 
Judgmental Sample. Oxide from impure 
solutions, high H2O H001181 
H003807 
H003598 
H002468 
Random Sample 
H002869 
H002565 
H003181 
Hanford 
Pressure and Corrosion 
Pressure and Corrosion 
Judgmental Sample. With Cl salt, 
packaged in RMC, high H2O 
H003655 
Hanford Total 24 
LLNL Pressure and Corrosion Pressure and Corrosion Random Sample L000172 
LLNL Total 1 
Innocuous Pressure Random Sample R611336 
H000891 
R600183 
R600445 
R600498 
R600833 
R601309 
R601571 
R601997 
R602477 
R602662 
R610247 
R610601 
Pressure Pressure Random Sample 
R610876 
R601882 Pressure Random Sample 
R610726 
R610898 
R611017 
Random Sample 
R611328 
Judgmental Sample. FTIR shows HCl R610910 
Judgmental Sample. Oldest Container > 
10 gm. H2O (Deferred FY05 sample) R600151 
SRS (Rocky 
Flats) 
Pressure and Corrosion 
Pressure and Corrosion 
Judgmental Sample. Maximum Pressure 
Uncorrected H2O (Deferred FY05 sample) R600793 
SRS (Rocky Flats) Total 22 
Grand Total 47 
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Table 3.4. Additional NDE Samples in FY 2006 
Site of origin FY 2005 ISP Bin FY 2006 ISP Bin Comment 
3013 
Container 
ID 
Rocky Flats Innocuous Pressure and Corrosion Sample of opportunity R611358 
Rocky Flats Pressure Pressure Sample of opportunity R610465 
Hanford Pressure Pressure Oxide from impure solution—High water H001201 
Hanford Pressure Pressure Repeat from FY 2005 H001892 
Hanford Pressure Pressure Repeat from FY 2005 H002066 
Hanford Pressure and Corrosion Pressure and Corrosion ARF >9 grams water H002509 
Hanford Pressure and Corrosion Pressure and Corrosion ARF with weight gain and like 011589A H002534 
Hanford Pressure and Corrosion Pressure and Corrosion ARF with weight gain H002624 
Hanford Pressure and Corrosion Pressure and Corrosion Special sample—like 011589A H002786 
Hanford Pressure and Corrosion Pressure and Corrosion Special sample—like 011589A H002809 
Hanford Pressure and Corrosion Pressure and Corrosion Special sample—like 011589A H002866 
Hanford Pressure and Corrosion Pressure and Corrosion C-line—high TGA H003032 
Hanford Pressure and Corrosion Pressure and Corrosion Special sample—like 011589A H003077 
Hanford Pressure and Corrosion Pressure and Corrosion Special sample—like 011589A H003343 
Hanford Pressure and Corrosion Pressure and Corrosion C-line—high TGA H003352 
Hanford Pressure and Corrosion Pressure and Corrosion Special sample—like 011589A H003626 
Hanford Pressure and Corrosion Pressure and Corrosion Special sample—like 011589A H003695 
Hanford Pressure and Corrosion Pressure and Corrosion Repeat from FY 2005 H003716 
Hanford Pressure and Corrosion Pressure and Corrosion ARF >9 grams water H003896 
Hanford Pressure and Corrosion Pressure and Corrosion Special sample—like 011589A H003931 
Hanford Pressure and Corrosion Pressure and Corrosion Special sample—like 011589A H003940 
Hanford Pressure and Corrosion Pressure and Corrosion Special sample—like 011589A H003989 
Hanford Pressure and Corrosion Pressure and Corrosion Highest weight gain H004099 
Hanford Pressure and Corrosion Pressure and Corrosion ARF with weight gain H004102 
Hanford Pressure and Corrosion Pressure and Corrosion ARF >9 grams water H004111 
Hanford Pressure and Corrosion Pressure Highest weight gain H004117 
Hanford Pressure and Corrosion Pressure and Corrosion ARF with weight gain H004153 
Hanford Pressure and Corrosion Pressure and Corrosion C-line—high TGA H004179 
Hanford Pressure and Corrosion Pressure and Corrosion Special sample—like 011589A H004232 
Hanford Pressure and Corrosion Pressure and Corrosion Special sample—like 011589A H004233 
 
3.4 Surveillance Samples for FY 2007 
Sample selection for FY 2007 surveillance activities was identified in FY 2006 using the revised 
binning results from FY 2006 (see Section 1 for binning results and Section 2 for the new 
statistical sample). The FY 2007 NDE sample consisted of a subset of the new FY 2006 
statistical sample for the Pressure and Innocuous bins, minus the samples selected for FY 2005 
and FY 2006 examination that were still in the random sample. The DE sample selection for FY 
2007 consisted of random samples selected from the Pressure bin and Pressure and Corrosion bin 
statistical sample, and judgmental samples selected only from the Pressure and Corrosion bin. 
Random DE samples are required to be at least 5 years old at the time of evaluation. Engineering 
judgment considerations used for FY 2007 sample selection are discussed below. 
3.4.1 Summary of FY 2007 Container Selection 
Table 3.5 below lists the 36 containers selected for evaluation in FY 2007. Of these, 25 were 
randomly selected from the Pressure bin random sample, three were selected from the Pressure 
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and Corrosion sample (the only containers in the random sample meeting the age requirement), 
two from the Innocuous bin sample, and four based on engineering judgment. The remaining two 
items were Pressure containers that will have DE. These two containers were in the 2005 random 
selection for the Pressure bin and were selected by engineering judgment.  
 
Hanford is scheduled to evaluate 13 containers by NDE, and SRS is scheduled to evaluate 14 
containers by NDE and 9 containers by DE. These containers satisfy the FY07 selection criteria 
required by the ISP steering Committee for the DOE complex. All randomly selected NDE and 
DE containers are required to be at least three years old and five years old, respectively, (from 
the inner can weld date) by the end of June 2006. This list is the minimum necessary to meet the 
requirements of the ISP. Additional containers may be evaluated as necessary by each site based 
on site-specific needs. 
3.4.2 Judgmental Sample Selection for FY 2007 
Results from the FY 2005 container NDE tests indicated that no pressurization above the 
established action limits was observed.30–32 The maximum container pressure observed by SRS 
surveillance was less than 10 psi, and no container integrity issues were found.26 
 
Evaluation of the ongoing small-scale test program at LANL identified three MIS small-scale 
test samples that exhibit behavior that warrants further investigation. First, MIS item  
ARF-1085-223 (ARF-223) showed significant pitting corrosion of the small-scale test reactor 
with relatively high hydrogen generation.30 Second, as of August 2006, MIS item C06032A had 
the highest total gas generation of all MIS small-scale test samples.33 And third, MIS Item 
011589A is generating both hydrogen and oxygen gas, which has reached flammable levels in 
the small-scale test reactor.34-36 
 
Four judgmental samples were selected for DE analysis by members of the Engineering Review 
Team (a subset of the MIS Working Group) and are listed in Table 3.5. One container was 
selected based on similarity to MIS item ARF-223, one based on similarity to C06032A, and two 
containers based on similarity to MIS item 011589A. A strict time limit since packaging is not 
imposed for judgmental samples; however, time is one of the factors used in the selection 
process.  
 
The two containers selected for DE analysis from the Pressure bin statistical sample were 
identified using engineering judgment (Appendix A—Table A-2) and meeting the requirement 
that they would be at least five years old by June 30, 2007.  
 37 
 
Table 3.5. DE and NDE Samples For FY 2007 
Surveillance 
Site ID ISP Bin 
FY07 
Sample 
Method 
FY 07 
sample 
type Surveillance Comment 
3013 
Container 
ID 
H001373 
H001517 
H001527 
H001955 
H002145 
H002148 
H002153 
H002221 
H002716 
H003665 
H004304 
H004331 
Hanford Pressure NDE Random Random sample >3 yr. old 
H004590 
Hanford Total 13
H000872 Innocuous NDE Random Random sample >3 yr. old 
R610009 
R600885† DE Random Random sample >5 yr. old 
R601722† 
H000895 
R600320 
R600944 
R601318 
R601450 
R601569 
R602483 
R602804 
R610351 
R610809 
Pressure 
NDE Random Random sample >3 yr. old 
R611379 
Like ARF-223, (Also from HCl plot) R610697 
Like C06032A, (Also from HCl plot) R610735 
Most Like 011589A R602498 
Judgmental 
Potentially like 011589A, (Also from 
HCl plot) R611398 
R600719 
R601285 
SRS (Rocky 
Flats) 
Pressure and 
Corrosion 
DE 
Random Random sample >5 yr. old 
R601957 
SRS (SRS) Pressure NDE Random Random sample >3yr. old S001669 
SRS Total 23
Grand Total 36
† R600885 and R601722 were nondestructively evaluated in FY 2005 
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3.5 Surveillance in FY 2008 and Beyond  
The recommended schedule for evaluation of all random samples is shown in Appendix A. The 
schedule is based on the minimum time since packaging and the surveillance rates specified in 
the Surveillance and Monitoring Plan.6 Containers in the Pressure and Corrosion bin should be 
evaluated destructively according to the schedule in Table A-1. Containers in the Pressure bin 
and Innocuous bin should be nondestructively examined according to the schedules in Tables 
A-2 and A-3, respectively. In addition, in FY 2008 and FY 2009, two containers per year from 
the Pressure bin will be selected for destructive examination based on engineering judgment. 
Sites may change the order that the random samples listed in tables A-1 through A-3 are selected 
for examination, as long as (1) they adhere to the 3/5 year minimum age for NDE/DE 
respectively, and (2) they notify the MIS working group that they have changed the order.  
 
Additional judgmental samples may be selected for either NDE or DE, based on results from 
field surveillances or MIS work. Any additional judgmental samples identified in the future will 
be documented in a letter from the MIS working group to the ISP Steering Committee and will 
be included in any future revisions to this document. 
 
This document will be reviewed and revised as needed. For example, the number and binning of 
containers yet to be packaged was based on best engineering judgment. It is likely that when all 
materials are packaged and the data evaluated, the number of containers in each bin will change. 
Also, future prompt gamma measurements as well as reanalysis of prompt gamma data and 
reanalysis of TGA moisture data may result in bin assignment changes. These changes could 
affect sample specifications. In addition, the field surveillance activities will be reviewed at MIS 
meetings. As part of those reviews, NDE results, shelf-life data, and updated 
stabilization/packaging data will be analyzed to determine if the FY 2007 sample and/or future 
year sample selections require modification. 
 
Acknowledgement 
Contributions to this report were made through personal conversations, conference calls, and 
informal e-mails, between the authors and members of the MIS Working Group. Also, 
preliminary drafts of this report were reviewed and commented on by the MIS Working Group. 
The MIS Working Group site representatives are listed below. 
 
Jennifer Burch, LLNL 
Karen Dodson, LLNL 
Richard Mason, LANL 
James McClard, SRS 
G. D. Roberson, DOE/AL  
Richard W. Szempruch, Fluor Hanford 
Jerry Stakebake, Consultant 
Theodore J. Venetz, Fluor Hanford 
 39 
References 
1. L. Peppers, E. Kelly, J. McClard, J. Stakebake, and T. Venetz, “Binning of 3013 Containers for Field 
Surveillance,” Los Alamos National Laboratory report LA-14184 (June 2005). 
 
2. E. Kelly, J. McClard, L. Peppers, J. Stakebake, and T. Venetz, “3013 Surveillance Sampling—The 
Statistical Sample,” Los Alamos National Laboratory report LA-14185 (June 2005).  
 
3. L. Peppers, E. Kelly, K. Veirs, and J. Berg, “3013 Container Statistical and Judgmental Samples Selected 
for Non Destructive Evaluation (NDE) in FY 2005,” Los Alamos National Laboratory document  
LA-UR-05-2193 (July 2005). 
 
4. DOE, “Stabilization, Packaging, and Storage of Plutonium-Bearing Materials,” DOE-STD-3013, U.S. 
Department of Energy. 
 
5. “Integrated Surveillance Program in Support of Long-Term Storage of Plutonium-Bearing Materials,” Los 
Alamos National Laboratory document LA-UR-00-3246, Rev. 1 (March 2001). 
 
6. “Surveillance and Monitoring Plan for DOE-STD-3013 Materials,” Westinghouse Savannah River 
Company report SR-NMPD-03-001, Rev. 0 (June 2003). 
 
7. J.M. Berg, “Re-Analysis of RFETS PuSPS TGA-FTIR Moisture Measurement Data,” Los Alamos National 
Laboratory document LA-UR-05-7395 (October 2005). 
 
8. L. Peppers, D. Prochnow, J. Narlesky, and J. Watts, “Integrated Surveillance Program Database,” Los 
Alamos National Laboratory (Microsoft® Access database available electronically and classified SRD) 
(2002–2006). 
 
9. T.J. Venetz, “PFP Material Representation in the Materials Identification and Surveillance Program,” Fluor 
Hanford report HNF-14482, Rev. 0 (January 2003). 
 
10. H.F. Dalton, “Rocky Flats Material Representation in the Materials Identification and Surveillance 
Program,” Department of Energy, Rocky Flats Field Office memorandum (May 7, 2001). 
 
11. R. McNew, “FB-Line Material Representation in the Materials Identification and Surveillance Program,” 
Westinghouse Savannah River Company report X-TR-F-00003, Revision 0 (October 2003). 
 
12. J. Narlesky, “Lawrence Livermore Prompt Gamma—Final Report,” Los Alamos National Laboratory 
document LA-UR-05-0755 (February 2006). 
 
13. J. Narlesky, “Prompt Gamma Analysis of the Savannah River Site 3013 Containers—Final Report,” Los 
Alamos National Laboratory document LA-UR-06-1245 (February 2006). 
 
14. D.R. Spearing and W.J. Crooks, “Gas Generation Mechanisms in Pu Metal Bearing DOE-3013 
Containers,” Los Alamos National Laboratory document LA-UR-03-1214 (April 2003). 
 
15. M.A. Williamson, “Plutonium Storage: Phase Equilibria Issues,” Los Alamos National Laboratory 
document LA-UR-99-136 Draft (January 1999). 
 
16. D.G. Kolman, “A Review Of The Potential Environmentally Assisted Failure Mechanisms Of Austenitic 
Stainless Steel Storage Containers Housing Stabilized Radioactive Compounds,” Corrosion Science 43 
(2001) 99–125. 
 
17. A.J. Sedriks, Corrosion of Stainless Steels, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York (1996). 
 
18. P. Zapp and S. Lillard, “Review of Fluoride-Induced Corrosion of Austenitic Stainless Steel,” 
Westinghouse Savannah River Company, Savannah River National Laboratory document  
SRNL-MTS-2005-50025 (October 2005). 
 
19. K. Veirs, “Small-Scale Surveillance,” Materials Identification and Surveillance (MIS) Conference 
Proceedings, Savannah River Site, South Carolina, Los Alamos National Laboratory document  
LA-UR-06-3404 (April 25–26, 2006). 
 
20. J. Berg, L. Morales, M. Brugh, Y. Mazza, and G. S. Barney, “Observations of Hydrogen Chloride 
 40 
Evolution During TGA Analysis of Plutonium-Bearing Oxide Materials Stabilized in Conformance with 
DOE-STD-3013-2000,” Los Alamos National Laboratory document LA-UR-04-0654 (January 2004). 
 
21. “Los Alamos National Laboratory Materials Stabilization Project—Project Execution Plan,” Los Alamos 
National Laboratory document LA-UR-05-3271 (March 2005). 
 
22. W.G. Cochran, Sampling Techniques, Third Edition (John Wiley & Sons, New York 1977). 
 
23. S-PLUS 6 for Windows, Insightful Corporation, Seattle, Washington, Copyright © 1987–2001. 
 
24. R. Szempruch, et al., “Resolution of Issues Associated with Digital Radiography of 3013 Containers,” 
Fluor Hanford report NMS-19056, (March 2004). 
 
25. T. Venetz, “PFP 3013 Surveillance,” Materials Identification and Surveillance (MIS) Conference 
Proceedings, Albuquerque, New Mexico, Los Alamos National Laboratory document LA-UR-04-8813 
(October 19–20, 2004). 
 
26. T. Venetz, “Hanford FY05 Field Surveillance Activities in Support of the DOE Integrated Surveillance 
Program for DOE-STD-3013 Containers,” Fluor Hanford report NMS-27644 (October 2005). 
 
27. S.W. McAlhany, “Fiscal Year (FY) 2005 Non Destructive Examination List for Sites Storing DOE-STD-
3013 Containers,” Department of Energy, Savannah River Operations Office memorandum NMPD-05-049, 
(January 27, 2005). 
 
28. J. Berg, C. Delegard, D.K. Veirs, and P.G. Eller, “Evaluation of the Potential for CO2 Evolution from 
Plutonium-Bearing Oxide Materials Stabilized and Stored in Conformance With DOE-STD-3013-2000,” 
Los Alamos National Laboratory document LA-UR-03-0811 (March 2003). 
 
29. G.D. Roberson, “FY06 NDE Recommended Items,” Department of Energy, Albuquerque Operations 
Office memorandum to Allen Gunter, Integrated Surveillance Program Chair. 
 
30. K.J. Durrwachter, K.A. Dunn, and J.W. McClard, “3013/9975 Surveillance Program Annual Summary 
Report (FY05),” Westinghouse Savannah River Company, Savannah River Site report  
WSRC-TR-2005-00422 (September 2005). 
 
31. “The Savannah River Site Surveillance Program for the Storage of 9975 Plutonium Packages in KAMS,” 
Westinghouse Savannah River Company report WSRC-TR-2001-00286, Revision 2. 
 
32. D.K. Veirs, et al., “Gas Generation and Corrosion in Salt-Containing Impure Plutonium Oxide Materials: 
Initial Results for ARF-102-85-223,” Los Alamos National Laboratory report LA-14148 (July 2004). 
 
33. J.E. Narlesky, J.M. Berg, and D.K. Veirs, “Identification of 3013 Containers Represented by MIS Sample 
C06032A,” Los Alamos National Laboratory document LA-UR-06-6460 (August 2006). 
 
34. J.M. Berg, D.K. Veirs, and L.A. Worl, “Maximum Pressure for Structural Response Calculation of 3013 
Containers,” Los Alamos National Laboratory document LA-UR-06-4051 (June 2006). 
 
35. G.D. Roberson, “Transmittal of Information Identified by the Surveillance and Monitoring Program 
Relating to DOE-STD-3013-2004,” Department of Energy, Albuquerque Operations Office memorandum 
to Allen Gunter, Integrated Surveillance Program Chair, (June 22, 2006). 
 
36. G.P. Friday and L.G. Peppers, “Investigation of MIS Item 011589A and 3013 Containers Having Similar 
Characteristics,” Washington Savannah River Company, Savannah River National Laboratory report 
WSRC-TR-2006-00236 (August 2006).  
 
 
 A-1 
Appendix A—Random Sample Based on FY 2006 Rebinning 
Table A-1 – Pressure and Corrosion Bin Random Sample 
Container ID Site FY06 Bin FY06 Sub bin 
Inner Can 
Date DE Eval. Year 
R600719 RFETS Pressure and Corrosion BDT-4-RF-2B 14-Jan-02 2007 
R601285 RFETS Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl 14-May-02 2007 
R601957 RFETS Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl 19-Feb-02 2007 
H001885 Hanford Pressure and Corrosion BDT-4-H-2B 17-Nov-02 2008 
H001916 Hanford Pressure and Corrosion BDT-4-H-2B 22-Aug-02 2008 
H001941 Hanford Pressure and Corrosion BDT-4-H-2B 01-Oct-02 2008 
H001992 Hanford Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-F 11-Sep-02 2008 
H003157 Hanford Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-F 21-Oct-02 2008 
H000898 RFETS Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-F 18-Dec-02 2008 
R602731 RFETS Pressure and Corrosion BDT-4-RF-2B 10-Oct-02 2008 
R610298 RFETS Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl 13-Jan-03 2008 
R610324 RFETS Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl 26-Feb-03 2008 
R610327 RFETS Pressure and Corrosion ER-C5-HCl (No PG) 02-Jan-03 2008 
R610558 RFETS Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-F 14-Apr-03 2008 
R610578 RFETS Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl 08-Apr-03 2008 
R610584 RFETS Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-F 07-Apr-03 2008 
H002195 Hanford Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl 03-Feb-03 2009 
H002200 Hanford Pressure and Corrosion BDT-4-H-2B 04-Feb-03 2009 
H002354 Hanford Pressure and Corrosion BDT-4-H-2B 11-Mar-03 2009 
H002447 Hanford Pressure and Corrosion BDT-4-H-1E 12-May-03 2009 
H003004 Hanford Pressure and Corrosion BDT-4-H-2B 10-Jun-03 2009 
H003077 Hanford Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl 05-Jun-03 2009 
H003367 Hanford Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl 18-Jun-03 2009 
H003409 Hanford Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl 24-Jun-03 2009 
R610573 RFETS Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl 15-Apr-03 2009 
R610679 RFETS Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-F 18-Apr-03 2009 
R610700 RFETS Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-F 18-Apr-03 2009 
R610764 RFETS Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl 22-Apr-03 2009 
R610806 RFETS Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl 16-Apr-03 2009 
H002521 Hanford Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl 27-Jul-03 2010 
H002553 Hanford Pressure and Corrosion BDT-4-H-1E 28-Jul-03 2010 
H002554 Hanford Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl 24-Jul-03 2010 
H002567 Hanford Pressure and Corrosion BDT-4-H-1E 23-Jul-03 2010 
H002667 Hanford Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl 15-Jul-03 2010 
H002728 Hanford Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl 25-Jun-03 2010 
H002750 Hanford Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl 08-Jul-03 2010 
H002786 Hanford Pressure and Corrosion BDT-4-H-1E 09-Jul-03 2010 
R610627 RFETS Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl 13-May-03 2010 
R610712 RFETS Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl 13-May-03 2010 
R610785 RFETS Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl 30-Apr-03 2010 
R610826 RFETS Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl 13-May-03 2010 
R610853 RFETS Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl 12-May-03 2010 
H002592 Hanford Pressure and Corrosion BDT-4-H-1E 31-Jul-03 2011 
H002715 Hanford Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl 05-Aug-03 2011 
H003526 Hanford Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl 25-Aug-03 2011 
H003565 Hanford Pressure and Corrosion BDT-4-H-1E 07-Sep-03 2011 
 A-2 
Container ID Site FY06 Bin FY06 Sub bin 
Inner Can 
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H003613 Hanford Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl 11-Sep-03 2011 
H003710 Hanford Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl 04-Sep-03 2011 
H003711 Hanford Pressure and Corrosion BDT-4-H-1E 07-Sep-03 2011 
H003720 Hanford Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl 31-Aug-03 2011 
L000178 LLNL Pressure and Corrosion BDT-4 (LLNL Washed) 23-Jul-03 2011 
R610960 RFETS Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl 15-May-03 2011 
R610974 RFETS Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl-HCl 21-May-03 2011 
R611131 RFETS Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl 03-Jun-03 2011 
R611338 RFETS Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl-HCl 22-May-03 2011 
H003326 Hanford Pressure and Corrosion BDT-4-H-1E 05-Oct-03 2012 
H003337 Hanford Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl 12-Oct-03 2012 
H003652 Hanford Pressure and Corrosion BDT-4-H-1E 14-Sep-03 2012 
H003687 Hanford Pressure and Corrosion BDT-4-H-1E 28-Sep-03 2012 
H003704 Hanford Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl 21-Sep-03 2012 
H003898 Hanford Pressure and Corrosion BDT-4-H-1E 28-Oct-03 2012 
H004048 Hanford Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl 04-Nov-03 2012 
L000075 LLNL Pressure and Corrosion BDT-4 (LLNL Washed) 16-Jan-03 2012 
R610906 RFETS Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl 06-Jun-03 2012 
R610989 RFETS Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl 04-Jun-03 2012 
R611019 RFETS Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl-HCl 06-Jun-03 2012 
R611068 RFETS Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl-HCl 05-Jun-03 2012 
S001721 SRS Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl 28-May-04 2012 
H003970 Hanford Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl 13-Nov-03 2013 
H004010 Hanford Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl 17-Nov-03 2013 
H004012 Hanford Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl 05-Nov-03 2013 
H004014 Hanford Pressure and Corrosion BDT-4-H-1E 17-Nov-03 2013 
H004024 Hanford Pressure and Corrosion BDT-4-H-1E 14-Nov-03 2013 
H004046 Hanford Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl 05-Nov-03 2013 
L000196 LLNL Pressure and Corrosion BDT-4 (LLNL Washed) 02-Oct-03 2013 
L000202 LLNL Pressure and Corrosion BDT-4 (LLNL Washed) 05-Dec-03 2013 
R610913 RFETS Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl 11-Jun-03 2013 
R611189 RFETS Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl 11-Jun-03 2013 
R611207 RFETS Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl 11-Jun-03 2013 
R611328 RFETS Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl 26-Jun-03 2013 
S001150 SRS Pressure and Corrosion BDT-4-SR-ARF 18-Oct-04 2013 
H003910 Hanford Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl 19-Nov-03 2014 
H004100 Hanford Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl 19-Nov-03 2014 
H004104 Hanford Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl 20-Nov-03 2014 
H004152 Hanford Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl 23-Nov-03 2014 
H004164 Hanford Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl 23-Nov-03 2014 
H004173 Hanford Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl 04-Dec-03 2014 
Future LANL Pressure and Corrosion Future 30-Jun-08 2014 
L000172 LLNL Pressure and Corrosion BDT-4 (LLNL Washed) 03-Jul-03 2014 
L000223 LLNL Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl 12-Feb-04 2014 
R610728 RFETS Pressure and Corrosion BDT-4-RF-2B 18-Jun-03 2014 
R611402 RFETS Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl 20-Jun-03 2014 
S002160 SRS Pressure and Corrosion BDT-4-SR-ARF 31-Oct-04 2014 
S002288 SRS Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl 23-Oct-04 2014 
H003307 Hanford Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl 10-Dec-03 2015 
H004213 Hanford Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl 07-Dec-03 2015 
H004220 Hanford Pressure and Corrosion BDT-4-H-1E 10-Dec-03 2015 
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H004231 Hanford Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl 10-Dec-03 2015 
H004248 Hanford Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl 08-Dec-03 2015 
H004251 Hanford Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl 10-Dec-03 2015 
Future LANL Pressure and Corrosion Future 30-Jun-08 2015 
Future LLNL Pressure and Corrosion Future 30-Jun-08 2015 
Future LLNL Pressure and Corrosion Future 30-Jun-08 2015 
Future LLNL Pressure and Corrosion Future 30-Jun-08 2015 
R611309 RFETS Pressure and Corrosion BDT-4-RF-2B 24-Jun-03 2015 
R611417 RFETS Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl 25-Jun-03 2015 
S002132 SRS Pressure and Corrosion BDT-4-SR-ARF 03-Nov-04 2015 
H002809 Hanford Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl 01-Jan-04 2016 
H003052 Hanford Pressure and Corrosion BDT-4-H-1E 29-Dec-03 2016 
H003064 Hanford Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl 08-Jan-04 2016 
H003276 Hanford Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl 01-Jan-04 2016 
H003313 Hanford Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl 12-Dec-03 2016 
H004219 Hanford Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl 14-Dec-03 2016 
Future LANL Pressure and Corrosion Future 30-Jun-08 2016 
Future LLNL Pressure and Corrosion Future 30-Jun-08 2016 
Future LLNL Pressure and Corrosion Future 30-Jun-08 2016 
R611306 RFETS Pressure and Corrosion BDT-4-RF-2B 30-Jun-03 2016 
R611376 RFETS Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl 02-Jul-03 2016 
S002116 SRS Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl 13-Nov-04 2016 
S002220 SRS Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-F 23-Dec-04 2016 
H002826 Hanford Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl 20-Jan-04 2017 
H002862 Hanford Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-F 14-Jan-04 2017 
H003181 Hanford Pressure and Corrosion BDT-4-H-1E 08-Jan-04 2017 
H003280 Hanford Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-F 21-Jan-04 2017 
H003312 Hanford Pressure and Corrosion BDT-4-H-1E 23-Dec-03 2017 
H003625 Hanford Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl 03-Sep-03 2017 
Future LANL Pressure and Corrosion Future 30-Jun-08 2017 
Future LLNL Pressure and Corrosion Future 30-Jun-08 2017 
Future LLNL Pressure and Corrosion Future 30-Jun-08 2017 
R611101 RFETS Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-Cl-HCl 08-Jul-03 2017 
S002250 SRS Pressure and Corrosion BDT-3-F 08-Jan-05 2017 
 
Note: Four containers from LANL and seven from LLNL have not been specified as of August, 2006. LANL 
currently forecasts thirty Pressure and Corrosion containers, and LLNL estimates that they will produce another 
sixty-one containers. The remaining LANL and LLNL random sample containers will be selected from these 
containers. 
 A-4 
Table A-2 – Pressure Bin Random Sample 
Container ID Site FY06 Bin FY06 Sub bin 
Inner Can 
Date 
NDE Eval 
Year 
H001003 Hanford Pressure BDT-5 20-Dec-01 2005 
H001201 Hanford Pressure BDT-5 15-May-02 2005 
H001295 Hanford Pressure BDT-5 20-Nov-01 2005 
H001464 Hanford Pressure ER-C3 28-Jul-02 2005 
H001542 Hanford Pressure BDT-5 13-Nov-02 2005 
H001844 Hanford Pressure BDT-5 12-Nov-02 2005 
H001892 Hanford Pressure BDT-5 29-Oct-02 2005 
H001925 Hanford Pressure BDT-5 25-Nov-02 2005 
H001948 Hanford Pressure BDT-5 01-Oct-02 2005 
H002019 Hanford Pressure BDT-5 1-Oct-02 2005 
H002066 Hanford Pressure BDT-5 29-Oct-02 2005 
H002615 Hanford Pressure BDT-5 5-Jan-03 2005 
H002670 Hanford Pressure BDT-5 30-Dec-02 2005 
L000206 LLNL Pressure ER-C3 22-Dec-03 2005 
H000906 RFETS Pressure ER-C3 (Low F) 04-Mar-03 2005 
R600212 RFETS Pressure BDT-5 26-Apr-02 2005 
R600361 RFETS Pressure BDT-5 03-Apr-02 2005 
R600453 RFETS Pressure BDT-5 09-May-02 2005 
R600483 RFETS Pressure BDT-5 11-Apr-02 2005 
R600885† RFETS Pressure BDT-5 27-Feb-02 2005 
R601356 RFETS Pressure BDT-5 03-Jun-02 2005 
R601451 RFETS Pressure BDT-5 17-Oct-01 2005 
R601456 RFETS Pressure BDT-5 13-Nov-01 2005 
R601722† RFETS Pressure BDT-5 20-Feb-02 2005 
R601829 RFETS Pressure BDT-5 09-Jan-02 2005 
R601941 RFETS Pressure BDT-5 28-Jan-02 2005 
R602040 RFETS Pressure BDT-5 15-Feb-02 2005 
R602072 RFETS Pressure BDT-5 22-Jan-02 2005 
H001386 Hanford Pressure BDT-5 18-Jul-02 2006 
H002166 Hanford Pressure BDT-5 23-Jan-03 2006 
H002180 Hanford Pressure BDT-5 23-Jan-03 2006 
H002352 Hanford Pressure BDT-5 3-Apr-03 2006 
H002771 Hanford Pressure BDT-5 22-Jun-03 2006 
H002823 Hanford Pressure BDT-5 28-Dec-03 2006 
H003049 Hanford Pressure BDT-5 11-Jun-03 2006 
H003062 Hanford Pressure BDT-5 15-Jan-04 2006 
H003094 Hanford Pressure ER-C3 13-Jan-04 2006 
H003098 Hanford Pressure BDT-5 17-Jun-03 2006 
H003779 Hanford Pressure BDT-5 6-Oct-03 2006 
H003833 Hanford Pressure BDT-5 5-Oct-03 2006 
H004649 Hanford Pressure BDT-5 25-Sep-01 2006 
H000891 RFETS Pressure ER-C4-P 06-Feb-03 2006 
R600183 RFETS Pressure BDT-5 02-Nov-01 2006 
R600445 RFETS Pressure BDT-5 03-Apr-02 2006 
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R600498 RFETS Pressure BDT-5 11-Mar-02 2006 
R600833 RFETS Pressure BDT-5 11-Apr-02 2006 
R601309 RFETS Pressure ER-C2-P 26-Jul-02 2006 
R601571 RFETS Pressure BDT-5 07-May-02 2006 
R601997 RFETS Pressure BDT-5 19-Aug-02 2006 
R602477 RFETS Pressure BDT-5 04-Oct-02 2006 
R602662 RFETS Pressure ER-C3 27-Aug-02 2006 
R610247 RFETS Pressure ER-C3 11-Feb-03 2006 
R610601 RFETS Pressure ER-C3 31-Mar-03 2006 
R610726 RFETS Pressure BDT-5 28-Apr-03 2006 
R610876 RFETS Pressure ER-C3 09-May-03 2006 
H001373 Hanford Pressure BDT-5 24-Jun-02 2007 
H001517 Hanford Pressure BDT-5 7-Aug-02 2007 
H001527 Hanford Pressure BDT-5 25-Jul-02 2007 
H001955 Hanford Pressure BDT-5 16-Dec-02 2007 
H002145 Hanford Pressure BDT-5 27-Jan-03 2007 
H002148 Hanford Pressure BDT-5 20-Jan-03 2007 
H002153 Hanford Pressure BDT-5 6-Mar-03 2007 
H002221 Hanford Pressure BDT-5 4-Feb-03 2007 
H002716 Hanford Pressure ER-C2-P (Low F) 27-Aug-03 2007 
H003665 Hanford Pressure BDT-5 14-Sep-03 2007 
H004304 Hanford Pressure BDT-5 15-Jan-04 2007 
H004331 Hanford Pressure ER-C3 21-Jan-04 2007 
H004590 Hanford Pressure BDT-5 7-Sep-01 2007 
H000895 RFETS Pressure BDT-5 21-Jan-03 2007 
R600320 RFETS Pressure BDT-5 11-Mar-02 2007 
R600944 RFETS Pressure BDT-5 15-Apr-02 2007 
R601318 RFETS Pressure BDT-5 20-May-02 2007 
R601450 RFETS Pressure BDT-5 18-Sep-01 2007 
R601569 RFETS Pressure BDT-5 10-Sep-01 2007 
R602483 RFETS Pressure BDT-5 31-Jul-02 2007 
R602804 RFETS Pressure BDT-5 03-Oct-02 2007 
R610351 RFETS Pressure ER-C3 09-Jan-03 2007 
R610809 RFETS Pressure ER-C3 16-Apr-03 2007 
R611379 RFETS Pressure ER-C1-P 20-May-03 2007 
S001669 SRS Pressure BDT-5 07-Jun-04 2007 
H001198 Hanford Pressure ER-C4-P (No PG) 29-Jul-02 2008 
H001221 Hanford Pressure BDT-5 20-May-02 2008 
H001803 Hanford Pressure BDT-5 4-Nov-02 2008 
H001920 Hanford Pressure BDT-5 12-Nov-02 2008 
H001936 Hanford Pressure BDT-5 26-Nov-02 2008 
H001968 Hanford Pressure BDT-5 17-Nov-02 2008 
H002039 Hanford Pressure BDT-5 30-Jan-03 2008 
H002088 Hanford Pressure BDT-5 6-Nov-02 2008 
H002258 Hanford Pressure BDT-5 6-Feb-03 2008 
H002291 Hanford Pressure ER-C2-P 09-Apr-03 2008 
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H004695 Hanford Pressure BDT-5 02-Sep-01 2008 
R600330 RFETS Pressure BDT-5 11-Nov-01 2008 
R600503 RFETS Pressure BDT-5 02-Apr-02 2008 
R600565 RFETS Pressure BDT-5 10-May-02 2008 
R600802 RFETS Pressure BDT-5 05-Mar-02 2008 
R600927 RFETS Pressure BDT-5 09-Apr-02 2008 
R601106 RFETS Pressure BDT-5 11-Apr-02 2008 
R601577 RFETS Pressure BDT-5 06-Feb-02 2008 
R601627 RFETS Pressure BDT-5 13-Sep-01 2008 
R602223 RFETS Pressure BDT-5 02-May-02 2008 
R602577 RFETS Pressure BDT-5 16-May-02 2008 
S001543 SRS Pressure BDT-5 23-Feb-04 2008 
S001579 SRS Pressure BDT-5 23-Jan-04 2008 
S001682 SRS Pressure BDT-5 20-Jul-04 2008 
S001750 SRS Pressure BDT-5 06-Jul-04 2008 
H002385 Hanford Pressure ER-C2-E-P 21-May-03 2009 
H002444 Hanford Pressure BDT-5 20-May-03 2009 
H001614 Hanford Pressure BDT-5 22-Jan-03 2009 
H003119 Hanford Pressure BDT-5 19-Jan-04 2009 
H003166 Hanford Pressure ER-C2-P 23-Dec-03 2009 
H003593 Hanford Pressure BDT-5 24-Sep-03 2009 
H003684 Hanford Pressure ER-C3 10-Sep-03 2009 
H003709 Hanford Pressure BDT-5 21-Sep-03 2009 
H003809 Hanford Pressure ER-C2-P 06-Oct-03 2009 
H003824 Hanford Pressure ER-C2-P 3-Nov-03 2009 
H001917 Hanford Pressure BDT-5 14-Oct-02 2009 
Future LANL Pressure Future 30-Jun-06 2009 
H000529 RFETS Pressure ER-C3 18-Feb-03 2009 
H000841 RFETS Pressure ER-C1-P 13-Feb-03 2009 
H000861 RFETS Pressure ER-C3 (Low F) 12-Feb-03 2009 
R600219 RFETS Pressure BDT-5 09-Oct-02 2009 
R601887 RFETS Pressure BDT-5 01-Aug-02 2009 
R602729 RFETS Pressure BDT-5 01-Oct-02 2009 
R610062 RFETS Pressure BDT-5 09-Oct-02 2009 
R610152 RFETS Pressure ER-C3 17-Jan-03 2009 
R610984 RFETS Pressure ER-C3 16-May-03 2009 
R611284 RFETS Pressure ER-C3 26-Jun-03 2009 
S001671 SRS Pressure BDT-5 30-Jul-04 2009 
S001780 SRS Pressure BDT-5 28-Aug-04 2009 
S002226 SRS Pressure ER-C2-P (Low F) 09-Jan-05 2009 
†Containers R601722 and R600885 were selected for DE evaluation in FY 2007 
NOTE: one container from LANL has not been specified. It will be selected randomly  
from those packaged as of August 2006 (current estimate is 18 containers) 
 A-7 
Table A-3 – Innocuous Bin Random Sample 
Container 
ID Site FY06 Bin FY06 Sub bin 
Inner Can 
Date 
Evaluation 
Date 
Fluoride         
R610192 RFETS Innocuous ER-C2-I (Low F) 3/7/2003 2005 
H000872 RFETS Innocuous ER-C2-I (Low F) 12/30/2002 2007 
ER - No F          
H001189 Hanford Innocuous ER-C4-I 5/9/2002 2005 
H002097 Hanford Innocuous ER-BDT-6-I (No PG) 12/26/2002 2008 
R610009 RFETS Innocuous ER-C2-I 11/11/2002 2007 
H003321 Hanford Innocuous ER-BDT-6-I (No PG) 11/2/2003 2006 
S001178 SRS Innocuous ER-C1-I 12/20/2004 2009 
No - ER          
R601574 RFETS Innocuous BDT-6 8/4/2002 2005 
H002034 Hanford Innocuous BDT-6 10/20/2002 2008 
S001756 SRS Innocuous BDT-6 9/14/2004 2009 
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